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BASISFOR OUR CHOICE
OF DEFINITION
WE SELECTED a specific empirical counterpart to the term money after
considering a limited number of alternatives corresponding to the totals
in Table 1. One alternative that we didnotconsider nonetheless seems
to us a promising line of approach. It involves regarding assets as joint
products with different degrees of "moneyness" and defining the quan-
tity of money as the weighted sum of the aggregate value of all assets,
the weights varying with the degree of "moneyness" (section 1). After
considering the alternatives, we chose the sum of currency held by the
public plus adjusted deposits of commercial banks, both demand and
time. We chose this total in preference to a narrower total including
only currency and demand deposits, largely on the basis of a historical
review of the meaning of commercial bank demand and time deposits
in the United States and of the factors that produced changes in their
relative magnitude (section 2). We chose this total in preference to
broader totals on the basis of other evidence which also supported its
superiority to the narrower total (section 3 and the appendix to this
chapter). Further evidence that has become available since we made
our choice partly supports and partly argues against it (section 4).
1. Alternatives Considered
The common procedure, and the one that we have followed, is to define
money by classifying some assets as "money," and others as nonmoney
assets. The quantity of money is then equal to the aggregate value of148 Definition of Money
the assets it is decided to treat as money. In practice, for any given
country and period, only a small number of distinct asset categories
deserve serious consideration for designation as "money," in the light
of prior research and writing and the availability of data. As already
noted, each such category could in principle be further subdivided, so
that there is implied in listing categories an initial decision to neglect
the differences among the items within the categories. For the United
States, this limited set includes (in current terminology):
1. Currency (including coins and, in principle though not in practice,
American Express travelers' checks)
2. Demand deposits adjusted at commercial banks
3. Time deposits at commercial banks (including the few stock sav-
ings banks in existence), which, since 1961, should be subdivided
into (a) large negotiable certificates of deposits and (b) other
time deposits'
4. Deposits at mutual savings banks and at the Postal Savings System
5. Savings and, loan shares
6. Cash surrender value of life insurance policies(i.e., the stated
amount which is available on demand by terminating a life insur-
ance policy)
1Forthe bulk of the period we cover itis correct to treat commercial bank time
deposits as a single item, as we have done. However, the extensive development of large
negotiable certificates of deposit since 1961 makes it currently desirable to divide this
category into two parts: large certificates of deposit and other time deposits (see the
division of col. 3, Table 1, beginning Feb. 1961). The large certificates of deposit are
held primarily by firms and may be more like demand deposits or Treasury bills; the
other time deposits are held primarily by individuals and are comparable to the category
as a whole before 1961.
If not held to maturity, certificates are indistinguishable from other short-term money
market instruments like Treasury bills and commercial paper. On the other hand, the
practice of tailoring maturities to suit the needs of the persons or firms to which they
are issued may make the certificates closer in practice to demand deposits than are other
short-term money market instruments. We have no information on the extent of tailor-
ing of maturities, but we know that a secondary market in certificates is in existence.
Pending further information, our present inclination is to regard them as more nearly
comparable to Treasury bills and commercial paper than to demand deposits.
Recent experience has reinforced the desirability of separating out the large nego-
tiable certificates of deposit. In late 1968, market interest rates rose above the maximum
rates that banks are permitted to pay on certificates of deposit under Regulation Q.
The result was a rapid runoff of recorded certificates of deposit. However, this so-called
"disintermediation" was largely formal. Banks found ways to pay higher rates by various
devices that involved substituting other liabilities for recorded certificates of deposit.
The most important device was to substitute certificates of deposit issued by overseas
branches for certificates of deposit issued by head offices, the counterpart in the head
offices' books being "due to branches." From Jan.1, to July 30, 1969, certificates of
deposit liabilities of U.S. banks declined $9.3 billion; and U.S. banks' indebtedness to
own branches rose $8.6 billion.Basis for Choice of Definition 149
7. Series E government savings bonds (i.e., those government bonds
that are redeemable on demand for amounts stated in advance).
The distinctive characteristics of these seven items that make it plaus-
ible that they may be close substitutes in demand to their owners are
as follows: (a) each has a "face" value stated in nominal monetary
units and this "face" value is close to the nominal amount for which the
asset can be acquired (the buying price) and is also close to the nominal
amount that can be realized for the asset (the selling price); (b) in
practice, the use of the word "time" in item 3 and the formal
notice time required for items 4 and 5,2theassets can be sold within so
short a period that all can be described as available on demand; (c)
using the asset to finance purchases does not automatically involve in-
curring a matching liability. As far as we know, the only sizable sets of
assets other than those listed that share these characteristics are bal-
ances at stockbrokers and policy dividends left at interest with life
insurance companies (the return to policy-holders of part of the pay-
ments they have made on participating policies and annuity contracts).
Perhaps these additional items should have been included in the list.
Their omission simply reflects faithfulness to the literature.
It has often been argued that this list should also include "overdraft"
facilities at banks or established lines of credit at banks or "borrowing
power" on listed stocks and bonds and life insurance policies, or, more
recently, borrowing power on credit cards. These items do share many
of the characteristics of the seven listed—they are ways in which pur-
chasing power can be acquired on demand at terms specified in advance.
But they all differ in one important respect: acquiring purchasing power
automatically involves assuming a matching specific liability. Realizing
any of the seven items listed converts one asset into another; if the sum
realized is spent in ways that do not add to assets or reduce liabilities,
the result is a decline in net worth, but not in a form that involves spe-
cific obligations to make future payments. Drawing on a line of credit
involves simultaneously adding in the first instance to assets and to
liabilities; it means assuming obligations to make future payments.
Put differently, the sum of the seven items listed(plus the two
omitted), adjusted for double-counting, can be regarded as approxi-
mately the theoretical concept L(m), defined in Chapter 3 (pp. 134—
2Noformal notice was required for Postal Savings System deposits. Though interest
bearing, they were subject to withdrawal on demand.150 Definition of Money
135), as m tends toward zero, provided only that we limit L(m) to refer
solely to assets expressed in nominal values. The one apparent difference
is that L(m) is defined as the excess of assets over liabilities. However,
for m approaching zero, demand obligations of nonbanks or, more gen-
erally, nonfinancial intermediaries, are the only ones that should be
deducted. We can regard the omission of overdraft facilities, established
lines of credit, and "borrowing power" on securities, life insurance poli-
cies, and credit cards as justified because the obligations established
through their exercise would cancel the assets obtained—though this is
not strictly valid since the maturity of the obligations is different from
the maturity of the assets acquired. The only other major demand
obligation over the period we cover has been call loans on stocks, In
the late 1920's and early 1930's—the only time when such call loans
were of considerable magnitude—most of the loans were made by non-
banks. These would have to be treated as assets as well as liabilities and
would cancel each other. Such loans by banks were appreciable (rang-
ing as high as 5 per cent of total commercial bank deposits) during
those few years but not for most of the period we cover.
It may be that our neglect of overdraft facilities, lines of credit, "bor-
rowing power," credit cards, and call loans is not the most useful pro-
cedure. That is an empirical question, on which unfortunately we have
no evidence. In the absence of such evidence, we have followed the
common practice in the literature of calling attention to such items and
then subsequently ignoring them. More systematic attention to them
would be highly desirable.
Each of the seven items listed is defined by the class or classes of
institutions issuing the asset, although for currency this involves stretch-
ing the term "institutions" to include not only governments and banks
but also gold or silver mines. This is a consequence of a point made
earlier: the data are available mostly as a by-product of reports made
for business reasons or to satisfy regulatory agencies. As noted earlier,
it would be highly desirable to have data for classes of holders—particu-
larly for individuals and business enterprises separately—but no such
data exist that are anywhere nearly as comprehensive and accurate as
the data for classes of issuers.
The seven categories listed can in principle be combined into 127
different combinations of one or more items. In choosing a definition we
have in fact considered only four combinations:Basis for Choice of Definition 151
I:(1) plus (2)
II: (1) plus (2) plus (3)
III:(1) plus (2) plus (3) plus (4)
IV: (1) plus (2) plus (3) plus (4) plus (5)
Thesefour totals are shown in Table 1, suitably adjusted for double-
counting. If we were starting over again, we would now consider also,
for reasons stated above, these four combinations less item 2, and item
2 separately, with the idea of having two monetary totals, one approxi-
mating the balances of ultimate wealth-holders, and a second, the bal-
ances of business firms.
In extending these combinations beyond January 1961, we have also
distinguished in Table 1 two variants of II, ha, excluding large nego-
tiable time certificates of deposit; lib, including them.3 In making this
distinction—which had no significance at the time we chose our defini-
tion of money—we were naturally faced with the problem of which
total to regard as continuous with the earlier total II. As noted, we have
decided that ha is and hence designate that total "money."
We restricted our attention to the four combinations listed, partly for
practical reasons, partly because they seemed much the most likely can-
didates in light of earlier research and writing. The main practical rea-
sons were the availability of comparable data for a long period and the
fact that the main original data underlying our new estimates were for
banks.
The restriction of our attention to these four combinations seems a
less serious limitation to us than our acceptance of the common proce-
Uure of taking the quantity of money as equal to the aggregate value of
the assets it is decided to treat as money. This procedure is a very special
case of the more general approach discussed earlier. In brief, the general
approach consists of regarding each asset as a joint product having
different degrees of "moneyness," and defining the quantity of money
as the weighted sum of the aggregate value of all assets, the weights for
individual assets varying from zero to unity with a weight of unity
assigned to that asset or assets regarded as having the largest quantity
of "moneyness" per dollar of aggregate value. The procedure we have
followed implies that all weights are either zero or unity.
8Seefootnote 1, above. Statistics on large negotiable time certificates of deposits
began to be regularly reported weekly beginning June 1964. Weekly figures for earlier
months of that year are given in a summary table for 1964 (see Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Feb. 1965, p. 329). We constructed estimates beginning February 1961.152 Definition of Money
The more general approach has been suggested frequently but experi-
mented with only occasionally.4 We conjecture that this approach de-
serves and will get much more attention than it has so far received. The
chief problem with itis how to assign the weights and whether the
weights assigned by a particular method will be relatively stable for
different periods or places or highly erratic. So far there is only the
barest beginning of an answer.5
Pesek and Saving implicitly suggest that the weight be defined by (or
be proportional to) the ratio to the "market rate" of interest of the
difference between the "market rate" and the rate paid on the asset in
question. In application, the term "market rate" would be susceptible
to different interpretations. In the spirit of their analysis, presumably it
should be the rate on an asset like Treasury bills. If service charges on
demand deposits are treated as negative interest paid, this method would
currently assign a higher amount of "moneyness" (i.e., a higher weight)
to demand deposits than to currency and on many occasions a negative
4 J. G. Gurley, Liquidity and Financial Institutions inthe Postwar Period, Study
Paper No.14,U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Study of Employment,
Growth, and Price Levels, Washington, D.C., 1960, pp. 7—8; E. J. Kane, "Money as a
Weighted Aggregate," Zeitschri/t für Nationalökonomie, No. 3, Sept. 1964, PP. 222—243;
J. L. Ford and T. Stark, Long and Short Term Interest Rates, New York, 1967, pp. 1—3.
S Roy Elliott, in an unpublished dissertation, "Savings Deposits as Money" (Univer-
sity of Chicago, 1964), considered a special case in which he assigned a weight of
unity to currency plus demand deposits, of w to time deposits (defined as our items 3
and 4), and of zero to all other items. He estimated w by finding the value that gave
the highest correlation between the weighted sum and income among states, and income
plus various interest rates among time units for the country as a whole. His estimates
of w varied widely, both those from cross-section data for different years (.26 for 1929,
.35 for 1937, .65 for 1954) and those from time-series data for different periods.
A similar procedure has been used for time-series data by Richard H. Timberlake, Jr.,
and James Fortson, "Time Deposits in the Definition of Money," American Economic
Review, Mar. 1967, pp. 190—194, and by G. S. Laumas, "The Degree of Moneyness of
Savings Deposits," American Economic Review, June 1968, pp. 501—503. From annual
data, 1897—1965, Timberlake and Fortson conclude that only for the 1930's should
time deposits be included at all. From quarterly post-World War II data, Laumas con-
cludes that commercial bank time deposits should have a weight of .69;these plus
mutual and Postal Savings System deposits, an average weight of .48; and these plus
savings and loan shares, an average weight of .32.
V. Karuppan Chetty, "On Measuring the Nearness of Near-Moneys," American Eco-
nomic Review, June 1969, pp. 270—281, followed a somewhat more indirect procedure. To
get an adjusted stock of money he estimated indifference curves for various combinations
of different assets by calculating the hypothetical amount of currency plus demand de-
posits which would be equivalent in utility to the actual amount of currency plus demand
deposits and, say, commercial bank time deposits (i.e., he calculated one intercept of an
indifference curve). His statistical findings imply that if the weight of currency plus
demand deposits is taken to be unity, the weights of commercial bank time deposits,
mutual savings deposits, and savings and loan shares are all very close to unity. How-
ever, his estimates are solely for the postwar period and are dominated by trends during
that period and so cannot be considered reliable. The approach nonetheless has much
appeal.Basis for Choice of Definition 153
weight to mutual savings deposits or savings and loan shares. We have
doubts about the theoretical of this approach for reasons noted
in Chapter 3, section 1, above. However, as Elliott shows in his disser-
tation, the rates of interest paid on assets should enter into the deter-
mination of the weights, though perhaps in a somewhat different way.
Robert Noble has done much experimentation in the Workshop in
Money and Banking at the University of Chicago with the assignment
of weights by the use of factor analysis. These experiments are unpub-
lished because they were uniformly unsuccessful, in the sense that the
results do not appear reasonable when applied to special cases for which
the correct answer seems clear in advance (e.g., different kinds of cur-
rency).
From time to time, there have been vague suggestions that the elas-
ticity of substitution can be used to assign weights. Recently, V. K.
Chetty has worked out a procedure for assigning weights that is a logical
application of this idea. As yet, however, the procedure is in a very
early stage.6
In choosing among the four combinations listed, we in effect pro-
ceeded in two stages. First, we decided to regard commercial bank de-
posits as an aggregate rather than as separated into demand and time
components; in other words we combined items 2 and 3 instead of
keeping them separate. Second, we compared combinations II, III, and
IV. That is, in essence, we first chose between I and II, then among II,
Ill, and IV, though in making the tests to choose among the latter, we
included combination I as a further check on our initial decision.
This procedure was forced on us by purely statistical considerations.
The most important was that, for reasons explained in the appendix to
Chapter 8, we do not believe it is possible to get a reasonably accurate
statistical breakdown of commercial bank deposits between demand and
time deposits before 1914. After 1914 it is possible, and we present a
breakdown in Table 1. Hence, if we had decided that it was preferable
to use combination I instead of II after 1914, we would have had either
to engage in further statistical attempts to get a satisfactory breakdown
before 1914, or to reconcile ourselves to the use of two monetary totals,
one before and one after 1914. A much less important statistical con-
sideration is that the use of total commercial bank deposits makes it un-
6 See footnote 5,above.154 Definition of Money
necessary to divide high-powered money held by banks into the parts
considered as separately related to demand and time deposits in order to
eliminate double-counting correctly (see Chapter 1, section 4).
These statistical considerations, especially the first, were clearly strong
arguments in favor of combination II instead of I, since it is a great
advantage to be able to use a single concept for the whole period under
investigation. Had all other considerations been equal or even slightly
in favor of combination I,the statistical consiUerations would have
tipped the scales. However, we decided, on the basis of the material
presented in the next section, that other considerations also argued in
favor of treating all commercial bank deposits as a single total. In sec-
tion 3, we indicate the evidence that led us to choose combination II
instead of III or IV.
2. Commercial Bank Demand and Time Deposits
The issue discussed in this section is whether the total of demand-plus-
time deposits at commercial banks is a more homogeneous magnitude to
holders of deposits over the period, we cover than demand deposits
alone. The total will be more homogeneous if changes in the proportions
in which it is divided can be regarded either as a result predominantly
of changes in conditions of supply with little reflex influence through
demand (similar, for example, to changes in the ratio of silver certifi-
cates to national bank notes) or as reflecting near-perfect substitutabil-
ity in supply (similar, for example, to different denominations of notes).
Demand deposits alone will be more homogeneous if changes in the
division of a given total produced, let us say, by changes in conditions
of supply, exert a substantial reflex influence through demand,, because
holders of demand deposits seek to restore their former real value and
can do so only by changing income flows, not by simply converting one
type of deposit into another at unchanged terms. In that case demand
and time deposits would be more nearly analogous to, say, currency and
equity stocks than to national bank notes and silver certificates or to
different denominations of currency.
The Period Before 1914
For the period before 1914, there can be little question about the
answer: the total is more homogeneous than its parts. Precisely for thisBasis for Choice of Definition 155
reason data on the division of the total between demand and time de-
posits are hard to come by. As we have noted, banks had little reason
to be concerned about the relative size of demand and time deposits,
since reserve requirements for the two were the same. Their incentive
was to make their deposits as a whole attractive to customers by tailor-
ing them to their needs. Bank supervisory agencies had little reason to
insist on uniform classification and did not do so. What one bank called
time deposits, another might call demand deposits. So-called time de-
posits were often transferable by check. So-called demand deposits
often paid interest. The situation was clearly analogous to that of dif-
ferent denominations of currency: the various kinds of deposits offered
by the same institutions (commercial banks) displayed near-perfect
elasticity of substitution in supply; the actual proportions were deter-
mined by the requirements of depositors. The only difference from the
example of denominations of currency is that the rates of exchange were
not rigidly fixed, since banks paid different rates of interest on different
kinds of deposits to offset differences in other costs, and these rates
changed relative to one another from time to time.
The Period 1914—29
Since 1914, the situation has been very different and the correct
answer is much less clear. The division between demand deposits
and time deposits has been important to banks themselves for reserve
purposes, and supervisory agencies have had reason to insist on a uni-
form classification of deposits. The importance of the distinction to
banks has meant that conditions of supply have played a much more
important role in determining the form of the deposits. The importance
of the distinction to supervisory agencies has meant that there has un-
doubtedly been a more stable and systematic connection between the
words used to describe the deposits and their formal characteristics.
However, it is very likely that this has gone along with a good deal less
stability over either space or time in the economic significance of the
distinction. The relative costs to banks of supplying the two kinds of
liabilities have differed greatly among groups of banks at any one time
and for any one group of banks over time. As a result, banks have had,
to a varying degree at different times, incentives to enhance or reduce
the relative attractiveness of time deposits to their depositors, and they
have done so at least in part by changing the characteristics of deposits156 Definition of Money
labeled as "time" so as to make them either more like or less like de-
posits labeled "demand."
The introduction in the Federal Reserve Act of lower reserve re-
quirements for time deposits than for demand deposits gave member
banks an incentive to persuade their depositors to hold time deposits
rather than demand deposits. Nonmember banks initially had no such
incentive, though as time went by some states altered their laws to
match the federal law.7 The differential impact on the two classes of
banks is dramatically reflected in the figures (see Table 3). From June
1919 to June 1929, demand deposits grew at only a slightly higher rate
at member than at nonmember banks, while time deposits grew over
three times as rapidly. From June 1919 to June 1929, time deposits rose
from 34 to 47 per cent of the sum of time deposits and adjusted demand
deposits at all commercial banks. For member banks alone, they rose
from 26 per cent to 44 per cent; for nonmember banks, from 48 per
cent only to 51 per cent.8 As the table shows, almost the whole of the
relative growth in time deposits occurred after 1919, although the
change in reserve requirements occurred in 1914. The reason, presum-
ably, is that banks were not under reserve pressure until discount rates
were raised sharply in 1920.°
The changed reserve requirements did not affect all classes of member
banks equally. For time deposits the reserve requirement was the same
for all, but for demand deposits it was 13 per cent for banks in central
reserve cities, 10 per cent for banks in reserve cities, and 7 per cent for
country banks. Hence the differential varied sharply. As Table 4 shows,
the differential incentive clearly had the expected effect: there is a defi-
nite tendency for the spread between the rates of growth of time and
demand deposits to widen as the reserve differential widens.
7SeeCagan, Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money, NBER,
1965, Table 20, p.186. This table shows the average of state reserve requirements
weighted by the demand or time deposits of the commercial banks subject to them in
each state at ten different dates from 1909 to 1950. It does not indicate the number of
states with a different reserve requirement for demand and time deposits, at any date,
nor the growth in that number over time.
8Itshould be noted explicitly that these figures are for changing groups of banks.
Not only did some banks go out of business and others start, but many banks shifted
from nonmember to member Status. Such shifts might bias the results. For example, if
banks which shifted had a high ratio of time to demand deposits, it would be arithmeti-
cally possible for the ratio for all member banks to rise even though every bank sepa-
rately had a constant ratio. However, the shift in the ratio of time deposits is so large,
and deposits in banks shifting so small, that it seems most unlikely that data for a
stable group of member banks would differ much from those in Table 3.
9SeeA Monetary History, p. 209.Basis for Choice of Definition 157
TABLE 3
Average Annual Rates of Growth of Demand and Time Deposits
at Member and Nonmern her Banks, and Time Deposits as a Fraction of
Total Deposits Adjusted,a 1915-29
(per cent)
Period and Class of Deposit
Class ofBanks
Member Nonmember Total






















Time as Fraction of Total
Adjusteda
Deposits
June 1915 20.7 41.6 33.0
June 1919 25.7 43.0 34.2
June 1929 44.4 51.4 46.6
aOther than interbank and U.S. government deposits.
Source:All banks, from All-Bank Statistics, pp. 36, 60; member
banks, from Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 73; nonmember banks,
by subtraction.158 Definition of Money
TABLE 4
Average Annual Rates of Growth of Demand and Time Deposits







Rate of Growth Rates of Requirements
Demand Growth of on Demand
Reserve ClassDepositsTime Demand and and Time
of Member Banks Adjusted DepositsTime DepositsDeposits
Centralreserve
city 3.0 17.0 14.0 10
Reservecity 3.7 14.1 10.4 7
Country 2.0 9.1 7.1 4
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics, pp. 81, 87, 93, 99.
The devices by which the banks affected the ratio of time to demand
deposits were fairly straightforward. As we noted in A Monetary His-
tory, "banks increased the differential between interest paid on the two
kinds of deposits and offered services in connection with time deposits
designed to assimilate them to demand deposits." 10
Howgreat an inducement did member banks have to offer their de-
positors to achieve such a dramatic shift in the proportion of time to
demand deposits? Were depositors largely passive and easily induced to
switch or were they highly resistant? Unfortunately, data on rates of
interest paid by member banks on various classes of deposits are avail-
able only beginning 1927, and for insured nonmember banks only be-
ginning 1934, so a precise answer is impossible. However, the data avail-
able are sufficient to permit an unambiguous answer.
The average rate paid by all member banks on all deposits is available
from 1919 on (Table 5). It varied only from 1.81 to 2.06 per cent from
1919 to 1929 despite a rise in the ratio of time to demand deposits ad-
10AMonetary History, p. 276. See ibid., pp. 276—277, for evidence from Federal
Reserve documents about the tendency and about Federal Reserve concern.Basis for Choice of Definition 159
justed from .35 to .80, and despite a rate of interest on time deposits
at the end of the period that was nearly three times as high as on demand
d1eposits. The variations in the average rate paid are clearly related to
variations in the rate earned on assets. However, if allowance is made
for the rate of interest earned, the general trend over the period is up-
ward; interest earned is lower in 1927—29 than in 1919—21, but interest
paid is higher. Clearly, then, there was a rise in the average rate paid
that can be interpreted as the inducement offered to depositors to shift
from demand to time deposits.
The rise in average rate paid was sharpest from 1919 to 1921, when
the ratio of time deposits to demand deposits adjusted also rose most
rapidly. But the rise in those years as well as over the period as a
whole was so moderate that it does little violence to the facts to describe
the figures as showing a constant average rate of return to depositors
over the period on the whole of their deposits.
The relatively constant average rate presumably conceals a widened
differential between separate rates paid on time and on demand deposits
—the rate must have risen on time deposits and fallen on demand de-
posits, with the rise in the rate on time deposits adding more to interest
payments than the fall in the rate on demand deposits subtracted. But
even this shift could not have been large. At the extreme, both rates
could have been 1.81 in 1919, and the rate on time deposits could have
risen to 3.41 by 1929 and on demand deposits fallen to 1.23. But this
is a drastic overstatement since we know that rates were considerably
higher on time deposits than on demand deposits in 1919. Another in-
dication of the mildness of the shift is provided by applying the 1929
rates to the amounts of deposits of each class in each year. The hypo-
thetical average rate thus obtained differs only slightly from the actual
rate (Table 5,column6) and rises only slightly more.
These rates of return summarize the pecuniary return that depositors
received and show that it was roughly constant per dollar of total de-
posits. However, a major return from bank deposits is nonpecuniary—
the transfer of funds. The expenses incurred for this purpose explain
why banks pay a lower rate on deposits transferable by check than on
other deposits, and the value of the services explains why depositors
are willing to accept a lower rate. One measure of the quantity of non-
pecuniary services rendered is the volume of debits to bank accounts




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Basis for Choice of Definition 161
data only for weekly reporting member banks, not for all member banks.
Table 6 summarizes turnover figures for the former, separated into
banks in New York—where financial transactions make the turnover
much higher than elsewhere—and in 100 other leading cities. For each
category of banks the table gives turnover calculated in two ways: per
dollar of demand plus time deposits and per dollar of demand deposits
only.
The figures show an initial sharp drop in turnover. Undoubtedly
this is a reflection of the shift from the inflationary boom of 1919—20
to the sharp contraction of 1920—21—since turnover typically varies
cyclically. Thereafter all the turnover figures tend torise. But the
striking fact for our purposes is that they rise much more drastically
when calculated per dollar of demand deposits alone than per dollar of
total deposits—indeed, for banks outside New York City and for total
deposits turnover can be described as having remained roughly constant
from 1921 to 1929.
If we view deposits as an aggregate, these figures lend themselves to
the interpretation that depositors received roughly the same return in
both interest received and nonpecuniary services received per dollar of
total deposits. What happened was simply that the mix from which they
received this return varied, more of the interest coming from deposits
labeled time deposits and less from the deposits labeled demand deposits.
Notes to Table 5
Source, by Column
1.Banking and Monetary Statistics, pp. 72 (loans and investments)
and 262 (earnings). Earnings, 1919—26, include profits on securities
sold and interest on interbank balances. Earnings were divided by
annual average of total loans and investments at Dec. to Dec. call
dates inclusive, each Dec. weighted one-half and other call dates unity.
2—5. Banking and Monetary Statistics, pp. 73 (classes of deposits)
and 262 (interest paid). Rates were computed by dividing interest paid
by annual average of relevant deposits; annual average computed as
described above for earnings.
6. Rate of interest paid in 1929 on each class of deposits (cols.
3, 4, and 5) was applied to the actual annual average of demand, time,
and interbank deposits, 1919—28. The sum of the hypothetical amounts
paid in each year was then divided by the sum of the three classes of
actual deposits.
7. Computed from deposit figures, ibid, p. 73.162 Definition of Money
TABLE 6
Debits to Deposit Accounts: Ratio to Demand Plus Time
Deposits and to Demand Deposits Only, Weekly Reporting
&f ember Banks in and Outside New York City, 1919—29
(annual turnover rate)
New York Outside NewYork
Demand Plus Demand Demand Plus Demand
Year Time DepositsDeposits Time DepositsDeposits
1919 56.7 59.9 28.4 36.1
1920 56.0 60.0 26.9 37.3
1921 51.4 54.9 22.3 32.3
1922 55.3 61.8 21.3 31.1
1923 56.1 65.5 21.7 32.6
1924 56.8 66.5 20.8 31.8
1925 60.8 71.9 21.3 33.4
1926 65.2 77.8 21.3 34.3
1927 70.4 85.3 21.5 35.7
1928 85.3 106.3 22.1 37.6
1929 99.5 124.4 23.8 40.5
Source: Bankingand Monetary Statistics, p. 254.
The labeling of the ingredients was changed, but the combined package
was much the same. And only a minor increase in total return was re-
quired to induce the customers to buy the new mix, suggesting that they
had no strong preference about the proportions.
For the period 1914—29 it seems nearly crystal clear that the total of
commercial bank deposits is a more homogeneous category to holders
and more continuous with the corresponding total in earlier years than
demand deposits alone.
This conclusion is reinforced by the cyclical behavior of total deposits.
Their pattern during the 1920's seems entirely consistent with the pattern
of the corresponding total during earlier years.1'
11Seealso R. T. Selden, "Monetary Velocity in the United States," in Milton Fried-
man, ed., Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, Chicago, 1956, p. 237. The conclu-
sion is reinforced also by the behavior of velocity. The velocity of currency plus demand
deposits alone rose during the 1920's. The velocity of currency plus total commercial
bank deposits fell slowly, continuing the trend of earlier decades, again suggesting that
this monetary total was homogeneous over time.Basis for Choice of Definition 163
The Great Contraction
During the Great Contraction, time and demand deposits at com-
mercial banks fell by roughly the same percentage—over one-third—so
that the percentage distribution between them remained unchanged.
Mutual savings deposits, on the other hand, actually rose—the relatively
low failure rate of mutual savings banks made them an attractive haven
for funds. Commercial banks were under fairly steady reserve pressure,
certainly until they started to accumulate reserves in excess of legal re-
quirements in late 1932, so that they continued to have an incentive
to expand time deposits relative to demand deposits. They did not suc-
ceed in doing so, either because they had already largely exhausted the
worthwhile possibilities in this direction by 1929, or because the declin-
ing interest rates and the rising bank failure rates made their task so
much more difficult that the best they could do was to stay in the same
place.
Interest rates earned by member banks on their loans and securities
fell drastically—from 5.70percent in 1929 to 4.06 in 1933—and so
did rates of interest paid depositors—from 2.05 per cent on all deposits
to 1.07 per cent (Table 7). The decline in the rate paid was smaller in
absolute size than in the rate earned, the difference reflecting the pressure
on other costs and on profits, for the most part the latter. Rates paid
fell on both demand and time deposits, on time deposits from 3.41 per
cent in 1929 to 2.74 in 1933, on demand deposits from 1.23 per cent
in 1929 to 0.28 in 1933. The decline was slightly greater for demand
deposits, so that the differential rose a trifle. Service charges on demand
deposits—for which there are no data for this period—may have been
imposed or may have risen. But this could hardly have affected signifi-
cantly the main point—that the relative conditions of supply of time
and demand deposits at commercial banks did not change appreciably
during 1929—33.
Turnover fell drastically both for demand plus time deposits and for
demand deposits only (Table 7)—a reflection of the business contrac-
tion and the associated decrease in velocity—whether measured for
currency plus demand deposits or for currency plus total commercial
bank deposits.
All in all, on the main issue of this section, these considerations sug-
gest that the conclusion reached for 1914—29 holds for 1929—33 as well,















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Basis for Choice of Definition 165
mand deposits at commercial banks, but each component separately,
was a homogeneous magnitude.
On an issue to be considered later, the rise in mutual savings deposits
raises the possibility that, for this period, commercial bank deposits plus
mutual savings deposits may be more continuous with the corresponding
total before 1929 than are commercial bank deposits alone.
The Period 1933—45
After the Great Contraction, a number of developments, all on the
supply side, affected, for the rest of the 1930's, the significance of the
division between demand and time deposits at commercial banks: the
emergence of large excess reserves, the prohibition of the payment of
interest on demand deposits, and the imposition of a maximum rate
that could be paid on time deposits.
The emergence of large reserves in excess of legal requirements after
1932 presumably reduced the importance to banks of the differential
reserve requirement for demand and time deposits. However, banks
accumulated excess reserves, we believe, primarily because their expe-
rience from 1929 to 1933 led them to regard the Federal Reserve as
an undependable source of funds to meet unexpected drains; and so
they felt the need to provide their own "prudential" reserves by ac-
cumulating cash in excess of required reserves.12 Hence they still had
an incentive to reduce required reserves, and therefore the differential
requirements remained important to them. The rises in reserve require-
ments imposed in 1936 and 1937 and only partly rescinded in 1938
raised requirements against both demand and time deposits by roughly
the same percentage. This had the effect of increasing the absolute dif-
ferential between them.
The large excess reserves were almost surely the most important
factor on the side of supply from 1932 to 1940, and they appear to
have had the effect one might expect: time deposits at commercial banks
fell sharply relative to demand deposits adjusted, from three-quarters
of demand deposits to less than one-half. However, there is no very
close connection between the size of the excess reserves in different
groups of banks and the extent of the decline in time deposits. Hence,
we cannot be sure that the decrease in time deposits was related to the
increase in excess reserves. After 1940, excess reserves fell to negligible
12 A Monetary History, pp. 449—462.TABLE 8
Interest Rates Earned and Paid by Member Banks and Ratio of
Their Time to Demand Deposits Adjusted, 1933—45
Interest Rate
DifferentialRatio of Paid on Demand
Deposits BetweenTime to
Earned onPaid on(servicechargesDemandandDemand
Loans andTimetreated as nega-Time De-Deposits
InvestmentsDepositstive interest)posit RatesAdjusted
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1933 4.06 2.74 .14 2.60 .68
1934 3.76 2.55 —.09 2.64 .63
1935 3.35 2.02 —.13 2.15 .56
1936 3.19 1.70 —.14 1.84 .52
1937 3.18 1.58 —.17 1.75 .52
1938 3.15 1.51 —.21 1.72 .54
1939 3.07 1.39 —.21 1.60 .48
1940 2.96 1.25 —.20 1.45 .43
1941 2.66 1.14 —.18 1.32 .38
1942 2.50 1.05 —.16 1.21 .33
1943 1.88 .88 —.12 1.10 .29
1944 1.87 .87 —.12 .99 .31
1945 1.20 .86 —.11 .97 .35
Source: Cols. 1—3 and 5: through 1941, same as for Table 5; there-
after, Member Bank Call Report, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, is the source of loans and investments and deposits,
and Supplement to Banking and Monetary Statistics, Section 6, Bank
Income, BoardofGovernors of the Federal Reserve System, Dec. 1966,
p. 6, is the source of income earned on loans and investments and serv-
ice charges on deposits. Beginning 1942, "other charges on loans"
are shown separately and were incLuded with other income earned on
loans arid investments in calculating the rate of interest shown in col.
1. Col. 4:col. 2 minus col. 3.
levels and have remained small since. Whatever effect this factor might
have bad in the 1930's, it was of no importance thereafter.
The prohibition of the payment of interest on demand deposits
acted in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 might be expected to have
mixed effects. Because banks were protected from price competition in
respect of demand deposits but not time deposits, the banks became
more eager to attract demand deposits. By the same token, the prohibi-Basis for Choice of Definition 167
tion made it more difficult for banks to attract demand deposits, since
they could offer only nonpecuniary inducements, and a widening of
the difference in pecuniary returns would make the two categories more
distinct for depositors. For the 1930's, none of these effects was of
appreciable significance. Market rates of interest were so low that com-
mercial banks offered low rates on time deposits and, even without the
legal prohibition, would have paid negligible interest on demand de-
posits. The legally fixed ceiling was, as it were, above the market price.
This is shown clearly in Table 8, which gives the rates of interest
earned and paid by member banks, 1933—45. This is the first period
for which service charges on demand deposits are quantitatively signifi-
cant, as well as the first for which separate data on them are available.
Service charges have been subtracted from interest paid on demand
deposits—of which there was a small and declining amount reported
through 1937—to give the net yield on demand deposits. From 1934
on, this net yield was negative.
In order to achieve the reduction in time deposits that banks appear
to have desired after 1933 because of their large excess reserves, they
had to induce depositors to alter the proportions and, as Table 8 shows,
they did so. The differential in favor of time deposits, which was 2.60
percentage points in 1933, fell to 1.32 by 1941. Again, depositors
appear to have been very sensitive to the terms offered. A decline in
the differential by about one percentage point was accompanied by a
decline in the ratio of time to demand deposits adjusted from two-thirds
to two-fifths.
The downward trend in the differential continued throughout the war
years, though the ratio of time to demand deposits adjusted fell through
1943 only and then rose to 1945, nearly reversing the earlier wartime
decline. This reversal probably reflects a shift in public preferences as
total liquid asset holdings rose and as the low level of rates time
deposits was accepted as part of a structure of interest rates expected
to persist.
The Postwar Period
Prohibition of the payment of interest on demand deposits became
more important after World War II, when rising market interest rates
produced rises in the rates paid on time deposits. In the absence of
the prohibition, the rising market rates would have raised the rates168 Definition of Money
paid on deposits. Instead, the banks were driven to devising
indirect means of paying interest on demand deposits, mostly through
offering a variety of additional services. One device they used was to
facilitate the substitutability of demand and time deposits—this time
not primarily to reduce required reserves, but in order to pay interest
on what, from the depositors' point of view, were the equivalent of
demand deposits, just as in the 1920's they had done the same thing
to enhance the attractiveness of time deposits. This offset to some ex-
tent, perhaps to a major extent, the dramatic widening of the differential
between the pecuniary returns to time and demand deposits from 0.93
percentage points in 1946 to 4.63 percentage points in 1966.13
Frequently, the offset is explicit. The posted schedule of bank service
charges consists of a stated charge for each item handled, less an allow-
ance at a stated rate for each dollar of average or minimum ledger
balance (or average less reserves). In a recent year the stated rate in a
sample of banks ranged from 1.20 to 3.00 per cent per annum on regu-
13 The additional services vary widely: from making loans at favorable rates to holders
of demand deposits (one reason for "compensating balances" on loans is to facilitate
this form of recompensing holders of demand deposits) to providing advice on invest-
ments or, in other areas, to pushing the sales of items produced by holders of demand
deposits to other borrowers, and to still other devices so varied as to defy organized
description. See Albert H. Cox, Jr., Regulation of Interest Rates on Bank Deposits,
Michigan Business Studies, Vol. XVII, No. 4, University of Michigan, 1966, p. 127.
The only component of these services that can be easily measured, even in principle,
is that of check clearing and the like rendered specifically in connection with demand
deposits. In a study of eighty small and medium-size member banks by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston for 1959, total operating expenses of demand deposits were
estimated at 2.31 per cent of demand deposits (Paul M. Horvitz, "A Close Look at
Bank Earnings," New England Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Aug.
1959). No comparable figure is given for service charges on demand deposits, but for
all member banks it was 0.38 per cent.
To derive from these figures an estimate of the contribution to the offset from these
services, we need to know (a)the corresponding figure for time deposits;(b) the
corresponding figures for both demand and time deposits in 1946; and (c) the change
in service charges on demand deposits. The increase in the gap between the costs per
dollar for demand and time deposits from 1946 to 1966 would be a measure of the
increase in differential services on demand deposits; the excess of this increase over (c)
would be a measure of the increase in uncompensated differential services. For all
member banks, (c)is 0.28 per cent, so allowance for additional service charges is a
minor factor. Unfortunately, we do not have figures for (a) and (b). On the extreme
assumption that all were zero the maximum offset would be about 2 percentage points.
The actual offset must be much less. Hence, ifthe figures for New England are
reasonably representative for the United States as a whole, and if increased services
offset a large part of the indirect interest differential, they have taken forms other than
services directly allocable to the conduct of checking accounts.
Instead of trying to explain the change in the differential return from 1946 to 1966,
we can use these figures to explain the absolute gap of 4.63 percentage points in 1966.
The maximum contribution of direct operating costs to this gap would be 2.31 less
service charges, or about 2 percentage points. This overestimates the contribution by
theoperatingcost per dollar of time deposits.Basis for Choice of Definition 169
tar checking and 1.50 to 4.50 per cent per annum on business checking
accounts.'4
Another factor that assumed importance only after the war was the
maximum that the monetary authorities were authorized by the Banking
Acts of 1933 and of 1935 to impose on the rates that commercial banks
could pay on time deposits. The ceiling first imposed was meaningless
for some years because it was well above the rates that banks were
induced to pay by market considerations. However, as interest rates in
general rose, the ceiling became effective, the rate of growth of com-
mercial bank time deposits slowed down drastically, and pressure de-
veloped to raise the ceiling. When the ceiling was raised (on January 1,
1957), there was initially a sharp spurt in commercial bank time de-
posits. As interest rates rose further, this cycle was repeated sporad-
ically, the ceiling being lifted again on January 1, 1962, July 17, 1963,
November 4, 1964, and December 6, 1965, partly lowered on July 20,
1966, and again on September 26, 1966, and raised for selected classes
on April 19, 1968, and January 21, Each rise followed a period
of a slow rate of growth of commercial bank time deposits and ushered
in a period of unusually rapid growth. The legal regulation of the rate
thus clearly contributed to erratic behavior of time deposits relative to
demand deposits.
Both the extraordinarily rapid growth of time deposits relative to
demand deposits from 1946 to 1967, as the differential interest paid
widened so dramatically, and the sensitivity of the time-demand deposit
ratio to the ceiling interest rate are further testimony to the willingness
of holders of deposits to change their form in response to rather modest
14See0. S. Pugh and 0. G. Wood, Jr., "Bank Service Charges in the South,"
National Banking Review, Dec. 1966, pp. 177—178; also, A. F. Jung, "Commercial Bank
Charges in New York and Ontario," ibid., Mar. 1965, p. 400.
15InDecember 1965, the ceiling was raised only on time certificates of deposits of
all maturities, the ceiling on returns to regular savings deposits remaining unchanged.
On July 20, 1966, the ceiling on multiple-maturity time certificates was reduced, and on
Sept. 26, 1966, the ceiling on single-maturity certificates less than $100,000 was also
reduced. On Apr. 19, 1968, single-maturity certificates of over $100,000 were further
subdivided by maturity, and the rates on maturities of Sixty days and over raised. On Jan.
21, 1970, the ceiling was raised on savings deposits and eight classes of time certificates
of deposit. The only classes on which the ceiling was not changed were multiple-maturity
certificates of less than ninety days and up-to-one-year single-maturity certificates of less
than $100,000.
Since November 1964 ceiling rates applicable to time certificates of deposit have been
higher than those applicable to savings deposits, except for certificates of less than
ninety days (from November 1964 to December 1965 and, for multiple-maturity certifi-
cates of this maturity, again since July 1966), to which the same ceiling rate as on
savings deposits applied.170 Definition of Money
incentives. The postwar changes in the ratio of time to demand deposits
were larger than those that occurred earlier, but only because the
changes in the incentive were also larger.
The erratic changes on the side of supply, in particular those pro-
duced by the discontinuous changes in ceiling interest rates, have made
the changes in the ratio of time deposits to demand deposits more
erratic as well. Undoubtedly, this means that both total deposits and
demand deposits alone are less homogeneous magnitudes over time
than they used to be, that both are cruder approximations to a concept
that had unchanging significance to a holder of deposits. However, the
continuity of the behavior of the ratio toward the forces affecting it,
the major role of changes affecting conditions of supply, and the sensi-
tivity of the response all suggest that, for the postwar as for the prewar
period, total commercial bank deposits is the less imperfect of the two
magnitudes.
One change that occurred toward the end of the period considered
and that was referred to earlier very likely justifies a slight modification
of that conclusion for the future. That change occurred in the composi-
tion of time and savings deposits held by individuals, partnerships, and
corporations at commercial banks. At the end of 1960, savings deposits
(which may be held only by individuals and certain nonprofit organiza-
tions and are usually evidenced by a passbook) accounted for nearly
nine-tenths of total time and savings deposits held by the public at
member banks; by mid-1967, the proportion ha.d dropped to three-
fifths. The remainder was about equally divided between consumer-type
time deposits (savings certificates, savings bonds, other nonnegotiable
certificates of deposit, and negotiable certificates in denominations of
less than $100,000), other time deposits (held mainly by business firms
and other large investors in the form of marketable instruments—gen-
erally $100,000 and over—at rates competitive with other money mar-
ket instruments), and open account time deposits (evidenced by a writ-
ten contract specifying terms and conditions and tailored to the needs
of the depositor). A large secondary market has developed in negotiable
certificates of deposit. Other time deposits held by business firms and
other large investors have been growing rapidly since 1961, though
they are still a minor part of total time and savings deposits held by
individuals, partnerships, and corporations. They are more analogous
to money market instruments than to household time deposits.
It seems likely that total commercial bank deposits less large certifi-Basis for Choice of Definition 171
cates of deposit and possibly less large, open account time deposits
will prove more homogeneous with the earlier total of commercial bank
deposits than will the total itself. This is the reason we have given the
two subtotals for the period since January 1961 in Table 1.
3. Comparison of Total Chosen with Broader Totals
The evidence presented in the preceding section argues strongly that
monetary total II (currency held by the public plus all commercial bank
deposits adjusted) was a more homogeneous magnitude to holders in
the United States, both for the century 1867—1968 as a whole and for
distinctive short periods within the century, than monetary total I (cur-
rency held by the public plus demand deposits adjusted). But that
evidence gives no guidance in the choice between monetary total II and
broader totals: total III, which adds deposits at mutual savings banks
and the Postal Savings System, and total IV, which adds also savings
and loan shares.
Total III shares with total lithe practical advantage that it is avail-
able on a comparable basis for the whole period since 1867. Total IV
shares with total I the disadvantage that it is available for only part of
the period. However, the disadvantage of total IV on this score is much
less serious. Our estimates go back further, to 1897 instead of 1914,
and when they start, the total amount of savings and loan shares is only
6.7 per cent of total III, so that even fairly crude estimates for earlier
years would serve to yield a conceptually homogeneous and statistically
reliable total for the whole period. This consideration therefore played
no role in our choice of II in preference to III and IV.
Deposits at mutual savings banks, postal savings, and savings and
loan shares have clearly been assets with a different mixture of pecuni-
ary and nonpecuniary returns than time deposits at commercial banks.
During the 1920's and again in the postwar period, at least until 1962,
the rate of interest paid on mutual savings deposits was about 1 per-
centage point higher than the rate paid on commercial bank time de-
posits, and the rate paid on savings and, loan shares, 1 1/4to1 % per-
centage points higher (Table 9).
Because the rate paid on postal savings was held constant at 2 per
cent, the differential between that rate and the rate on commercial bank
time deposits is a mirror reflection of the latter, ranging, in the years172 Definition of Money
covered in Table 9, from a high of 1.16 in 1946 to a low of —2.03 in
1966. The differentials between the rate on postal savings and on
mutual savings deposits and savings and loan shares show a similar
pattern. Postal savings have responded sensitively to these differentials:
from 1900 to 1929, when the differential was negative, they never
exceeded $150 million or about 1 per cent of commercial bank time
deposits. They rose rapidly during the Great Contraction; reached a
peak of $3.4 billion in 1947, a year after the highest differential re-
corded in Table 9; and then declined rapidly to $300 million in April
1966, when the Postal Savings System was discontinued. Never large
relative to the other items, these deposits seem most nearly comparable
in their characteristics to mutual savings deposits, with which we have
tended to combine them.
The differentials between the rates paid on mutual savings deposits
and savings and loan shares and the rate paid on commercial bank
time deposits are about the same size or smaller than the differential
between the rates paid on commercial bank time and demand deposits.
Given our willingness to combine commercial bank time and demand
deposits, we cannot regard thesedifferentialsasdisqualifying the
broader total from consideration.
However, the former differentials are in some respects more signifi-
cant than the differential between the rates on commercial bank time
and demand deposits. In the first place, the differential for commercial
bank deposits is clearly overstated by the costs of the services rendered
without charge in transferring and accounting for demand deposits. If
all service charges were made explicitly and separately, and explicit
interest on demand deposits replaced services rendered without charge,
the differential between rates paid on time and demand deposits would
be drastically reduced, possibly to a very small level.16 In the second
place, because commercial bank demand and time deposits are at the
same institutions, explicit or implicit arrangements are possible whereby
an individual holds both at the same institution, and it is mutually recog-
nized that what matters is primarily the total in both accounts, the mix
being determined to facilitate the bank's accommodation to legal reserve
requirements.
Given the general tendency for rates of return on debt instruments to
rise, at least for some range, with term to maturity—i.e., for there to
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Basis for Choice of Definition 175
exist liquidity premiums '7—the higher rates on mutual savings deposits
and the still higher rates on savings and loan shares suggest that they
are held for longer term contingencies than the time deposits at com-
mercial banks—that if they are a temporary abode of purchasing power,
the "temporary" is of longer duration than for commercial bank time
deposits.
Another factor differentiating these savings deposits from commercial
bank time deposits is the difference in geographical spread.
Mutual savings banks have operated in only eighteen states. If de-
posits at such banks are a very close substitute for time deposits at
commercial banks, their exclusion would impart a geographical bias to
the total. On the other hand, if they are not a close substitute, their
17R.A. Kessel, The Cyclical Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest Rates,
Occasional Paper 91, NBER, 1965, pp. 44—58.
Notesto Table 9
were limited to a maximum of $2,500 per depositor.
Data on actual dividends paid by savings and loan associations
during the 1920's are not available. 'However, the figure mentioned in
the text is supported by a survey by states, as of 1924, conducted by
the American Bankers Association. Information was obtained from 42
states on the nominal rate of interest paid by the associations com-
pared to that by banks on savings deposits (Building and Loan Assoc-
iations: A Survey, American Bankers Association, New York, n.d.).
Source, by Column
1.1920—29 (member bank), Table 5, col. 4. 1946—66 (insured com-
mercial bank), FDIC, Annual Report, 1953—66; annual interest on
deposits divided by average time deposits, Dec., June, Dec.
2.1920—29, Raymond 'Goldsmith, A Study of Savings in the United
States, 1955, Vol. I, pp. 413, 425; estimated annual U.S.
dividends paid divided by two-year average of year-end mutual savings
deposits. 1946—60, Mutual Savings Banking, National Association of
Mutual Savings Banks, prepared for Commission on Money and Credit,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1962, p. 87. 1961—66, Mutual Savings Banking,
National Fact Book, NAMSB, May 1967, p. 29.
3.Act of June 25, 1910, as amended 39 U.S.C. 520 1—5224.
4.1946—66, Savings and Loan Fact Book, 1967, U.S. Savings and
Loan League, pp. 58, 66; annual dividends on shares divided by two-
year average of year-end value of savings and loan shares outstanding.
5.Col. 1 minus ool. 2.
6.Col. 1 minus col. 3.
7.Col.1 minus col. 4.176 Definition of Money
inclusion would impart such a bias. To determine which is the case, we
computed for individual states and particular years (1915, 1929, 1950)
the ratios of mutual savings bank deposits to demand deposits (call
this M) and of commercial bank time deposits to demand deposits (call
this T)—with only the latter, of course, having any significance in states
without mutual savings banks. It was expected that T would tend to
be less in mutual savings bank states than in others, but M + T greater,
and that whether mutual savings deposits should be combined with
commercial bank time deposits would be indicated by just where in
this range the value of T fell for states not having mutual savings banks.
To our surprise, T itself, and therefore a fortiori M + T, turned out
to be larger in mutual savings bank states than in others.18 This test,
therefore, did not give the reasonably direct answer that had been antici-
pated. Comparison of different mutual savings states showed some evi-
dence of substitutability between the two types of deposits. However,
both the evidence and the indicated degree of substitutability were weak.
So far as this evidence goes, it probably argues for excluding mutual
savings deposits (section 1 of appendix to this chapter).
Savings and loan associations are present in all states. However, sav-
ings and loan shares are somewhat more concentrated geographically
than commercial bank time deposits. In December 1966 the four states
with the largest amounts of savings and loan shares (California, Illinois,
Ohio, and New York) accounted for 41 per cent of the aggregate of
such shares, whereas the four states with the largest amounts of com-
mercial bank time deposits (New York, California, Illinois, and Penn-
sylvania) accounted for 35 per cent of the aggregate of these deposits.
Hence, savings and loan shares raise somewhat the same problem of
geographical bias as mutual savings bank deposits.
These general considerations, though suggestive, offer a most uncer-
tain guide. We therefore supplemented them with a number of more
systematic and comprehensive tests designed to provide a quantitative
criterion. In these tests we included total I as well as broader totals to
check our earlier conclusions.
18Afterthe event, we rationalized our results by noting that states with mutual
savings banks tend to be located in the older and more developed regions of the United
States. Residents of those states probably have larger accumulated capital and liquid
assets than residents of states without mutual savings banks. This is supported by the
evidence that such states tend to have lower interest rates than other states and to be
exporters of capital.Basis for Choice of Definition 177
The general idea of these tests was to determine which total was likely
to yield the most stable demand function involving a small number of
variables. It is generally agreed that a scale variable—income, total
transactions, wealth, or a similar aggregate—is the most important sin-
gle variable affecting the quantity of money demanded.1° Hence we
made our tests by relating differences in the various totals for various
years or spatial units to corresponding differences in income. We checked
also the relation between the individual components of a total and
income to assure that the items combined are substitutes, as shown by
a higher correlation for the total than for the individual components.
One such test was applied to data for 1929—58 for the United States
in connection with a study of the relative stability of income velocity
and the multiplier.20 In that study a criterion wasdevelopedfor choos-
ing among alternative definitions along the lines just described.21 The
conclusion was that total II satisfied the criterion best.
Another test was applied to data for individual states in selected years.
Since there are no data on currency holdings, by states, this test had to
be restricted to deposits only.
Deposits per capita in the various states were correlated with income
per capita for each of the selected years (1929, 1935, 1940, 1950,
1955, 1960). The details are given in section 2 of the appendix to this
chapter. The correlation between income and demand deposits alone
is decidedly lower in each year than between income and either total
commercial bank deposits or commercial bank deposits plus mutual
savings deposits, or the latter total plus savings and loan shares, con-
firming the conclusion reached in section 2, above. For 1929, 1935,
and 1940 the correlations are highest for income and total commercial
bank deposits, though the correlations for income and the next broader
total, including mutual savings deposits, are not much lower. For 1950,
1955, and 1960, the correlations are highest for the broadest total, in-
cluding savings and loan shares, though again, the correlations are not
19Wenote that the concept of "most important variable" is itself a complex one.
20MiltonFriedman and David Meiselman, "The RelativeStabilityof Monetary
Velocity and the Investment Multiplier in the United States, 1897—1958," Stabilization
Policies, prepared for Commission on Money and Credit, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963,
pp. 182—183 and 242—244.
21Thecriterion was that the correlation between the total called money and national
income be higher than between each of the individual components of the total and
national income. Note that this is not the same as saying that the best total is the one
that has the highest correlation with national income, though in practice it turned out
that this condition was also satisfied.178 Definition of Money
much lower for income and the next narrower total, including mutual
savings deposits. The correlation between each class of deposits and
income is considerably lower than that between the monetary totals in
which each is included and income, suggesting that the three deposit
items and savings and loan shares are substitutes.
This test alone suggests that the best definition of money until World
War II includes both demand deposits adjusted and commercial bank
time deposits, and after World War II includes, in addition, mutual sav-
ing deposits and saving and loan shares.22
Though this evidence was not completely unmixed, it clearly con-
firmed our conclusion that total II was preferable to total I, and on the
whole seemed to favor II over III and IV. Hence, we settled on II as
the total to which we would apply the term "money" without additional
modifiers.
Evidence from cyclical behavior, though also somewhat mixed, re-
inforced our decision to keep mutual savings deposits separate. For
some individual cycles—notably in the World War I cycle, the 1929—33
contraction, and the 1933—38 cycle—mutual and postal savings deposits
behave very differently from commercial bank time deposits, which
move in close harmony with demand deposits. However, in other cycles
—notably in 1924—27, 1945—49, and 1949—54—savings deposits move
in close harmony with commercial bank time deposits, whereas the latter
move quite differently from demand deposits.
4.MoreRecent Evidence
We made our decision about how to define money early in the course
of our research, roughly a decade ago at the present writing (1968).
Since then, additional evidence bearing on the problem has become
22Inhis 1964 dissertation, "Savings Deposits as Money," Roy Elliott correlated data
for per capita deposits and per capita income in the various states in 1929, 1937, and
1954, using per capita demand deposits in one set of correlations, and per capita total
deposits, including time deposits at commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and the
Postal Savings System, in the other. The r2's between the logarithms of per capita income
and per capita demand deposits in 1929, 1937, and 1954 are .82, .76, and .49; and be-
tween per capita income and per capita total deposits in the same years, .85, .87, and
.80. To test whether mutual savings differed from other savings, Elliott, working with
1929 and 1954 data, added a dummy variable of unity for eleven states with mutual
savings banks and of zero for all other states in his sample. He concluded on the
basis of the test that mutual savings and other savings did not differ significantly.Basis for Choice of Definition 179
available, from our own work as well as the work of others. In addition,
the question of the best definition has received much more explicit
attention than it had earlier—partly in response to our work, partly as
a by-product of the tremendous increase in the amount of research on
monetary questions.
This additional light that has been shed on the question of definition
has forced us to reexamine and spell out in much greater detail than
we did initially the considerations that seem to us relevant to the choice.
But we have not undertaken a thorough reexamination of the question.
Though some of the additional evidence, like some that we considered,
argues for a different total, nothing that has come to light seemed to
us sufficient to compel a reexamination of our choice. Hence we can-
not say for certain, though we believe it highly likely, that if we were
to face the question anew at the present time, we would come out with
the same answer.
Insofar as the new evidence is adverse to our conclusion, or insofar
as the scholars interpreting the evidence believe that it is, the conflict
is primarily on the point on which we feel most secure: namely, our
decision to treat commercial bank deposits as a single total and hence
to choose total II in preference to I. And none of this new evidence
seems to us anything like so conclusive as that summarized in section 2,
above.
We would find it easier to be persuaded that, at least for the period
after World War II, total III or IV is preferable to II. But hardly any
of the additional evidence bears on this question.
In the rest of this section, we list with only brief comment the addi-
tional material that has come to our attention.
1. In studying the relation between the variability of the rate of
change in money and of the rate of change in net national product, we
made computations for 1915—60 for both totals I and II. The correla-
tions were consistently higher—though not by much—for total 11.23
2. In exploring the possibility of defining money as a weighted sum
of different asset totals, Roy Elliott estimated the weight that should be
assigned to savings deposits in combining demand deposits and savings
deposits. His calculations are for savings deposits defined to include not
only commercial bank time deposits but also deposits at mutual savings
23SeeM. Friedman andA. J.Schwartz, "Money and Business Cycles," Review of
Economics andStatistics, Feb.1963 Supplement, p. 45, footnote 16.180 Definition of Money
banks and the Postal Savings System. He estimated the weight of savings
deposits in a total where currency and demand deposits had a weight
of unity as .26 in 1929, .35in1937, and .65in1954. The implications
of Elliott's work are mixed. The first two results argue for the narrow
total of currency plus demand deposits; the final result, for a broa4er
total. Unfortunately, Elliott did not make any corresponding estimate
for commercial bank time deposits alone.24 The differences among the
years are consistent with our conclusion that narrower totals may be
indicated for the pre-Worid War II period than for the postwar period.
More recently, related calculations have been made by Timberlake
and Fortson, and by Laumas.25 Timberlake and Fortson interpret their
results as favoring total I. Laumas' results indicate that commercial
bank time deposits alone be given a weight of .69 and other
time deposits decidedly lower weights. Thus his results favor total II.
3. In a recent study of cross-sectional state data for the United States
for the eleven-year period 1949—59 Edgar L. Feige argues for the nar-
row definition, since he finds demand and time deposits at commercial
banks to be weak substitutes, with a declining degree of substitutability
over time.2° However valid the evidence in Feige's study for the period
since 1949, it may not be valid for earlier periods, especially the 1920's.
Equally important, because of the nature of his data, Feige had no
evidence on currency holdings.
In a review of Feige's book Donald Hester criticized Feige's results
on statistical grounds that do not appear to us Tong Hun
24 See footnote 22, above.
25 See footnote 5, above.
26 The Demand for Liquid Assets: A Temporal Cross-Section Analysis, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1964, pp. 25, 29, 37, 43.
27 Donald Hester, Review of The Demand for Liquid Assets, Journal of Political
Economy, Aug. 1966, pp. 409—410. Hester argues that there is simultaneous equation
bias because (1) income and (2) rates of return on various categories of deposits are
endogenous variables whereas Feige assumes them exogenous. This criticism might be
valid if Feige had constructed his regressions from aggregate data for the United States,
though even then some quantitative evidence would be required to show that the bias
is important.
However, Feige's basic unit of analysis is the state, not the nation. Even though
nominal income in the nation can be regarded as the endogenous resultant of an
exogenously determined money supply, the distribution of the total money supply among
the states in any year can be regarded as an endogenously determined resultant of an
exogenously determined distribution of income among the states. And, for any single
year, that is what Feige's regressions examine. At most this criticism has merit for
Feige's pooled regressions in which temporal variationisgiven scope toaffect his
results. However, his results for the pooled regressions are roughly the same as for
the average results for individual years, suggesting that any bias on this score is minor.Basis for Choice of Definition 181
Lee has published a more extensive criticism of Feige's results, involving
additional computations from both Feige's and other data. We consider
this in the next item, because Lee considers that his results besides con-
tracUcting those of Feige also contradict our definition.
4. Lee concludes from his own calculations that "nonbank intermedi-
ary liabilities"—by which he means deposits at mutual savings banks
and savings and loan shares—"are close substitutes for money" whether
money is defined as equal to our total I or our total II. He also con-
cludes that his results "contradict" the "supposition" that "time de-
posits are close or more perfect substitutes for demand deposits, but
other nonbank intermediary liabilities are not substitutable for demand
and time deposits," which he takes to be the basis for our choice of
total II over total I. "It is difficult," he says, "to reconcile their reason-
ing especially where savings and loan shares appear to be better sub-
stitutes for demand deposits than do time deposits." 28
Leedoes not himself indicate which definition of money he believes
his estimates to favor, but we interpret him as implicitly endorsing
total IV.
He explains the difference between his own results and the results
obtained by Feige as the consequence of what he regards as "an exces-
sive use of dummy variables" by Feige.29 Feige uses these variables to
allow for special circumstances of particular states or regions, such as
states that permit establishment of mutual savings banks and those that
do not and states that contain the main financial centers of each of
four regions and those that do not. As evidence that the use of dummy
variables is excessive, Lee cites multicollinearity between them and other
independent variables. This does suggest a real problem with the sta-
tistical stability of Feige's estimates. However, it certainly does not mean
that if the special features Feige seeks to control are present, as they
clearly are, correct results can be obtained by neglecting them, as Lee
The same considerations apply to rates of return. For the nation as a whole, as Hester
notes, it would be surprising if supply were perfectly elastic at an exogenously deter-
mined interest rate. But, surely, that is precisely what one would expect on theoretical
grounds to be true for individual states in a national financial market—just as horizontal
supply curves for individual consumers of a product are entirely consistent with an
inelastic supply curve for the industry as a whole.
28TongHun Lee, "Substitutability of Non-Bank Intermediary Liabilities for Money:
The Empirical Evidence," JournalofFinance, Sept. 1966, pp. 441—457, quotations from
p. 455.
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does in a regression using Feige's data (though not in one using Con-
sumer Survey data).
In part the difference between Lee and Feige is purely verbal. At one
point Lee interprets elasticities of one category of deposits with respect
to the return on another (cross-elasticities, for short) of —.75 and—.31
as "consistent with the substitution hypothesis of Gurley and Shaw,"
despite seven other cross-elasticities in the same set of regressions rang-
ing from —.28to +.12 with four negative and three positive.30 Feige
interprets cross-elasticities of —.55 and—.28,in a comparable set of
regressions, in which the seven other cross-elasticities range from —.13
to + .30 also with four negative, as indicating little substitutability and
as inconsistent with the Gurley-Shaw hypothesis. Clearly the difference
in the words used is vastly greater than in the statistical results.
The value of —.75cited above is the largest cross-elasticity Lee finds
for aggregate data. In his principal regressions for 1934—64, his cross-
elasticities vary from —.28to — Bymost standards these would
be designated inelastic responses, not interpreted as exhibiting in the
words of Lee, "strong support of the Gurley-Shaw hypothesis that non-
bank intermediary liabilities are a close substitute for money." Lee has
succumbed to the widespread confusion between statistical and economic
significance 32
Butthe difference is not only verbal. In some calculations, Lee gets
results that are strikingly different from Feige's.
The outstanding example is Lee's conclusion, quoted above, that
"savings and loan shares appear to be better substitutes for demand
deposits than do time deposits," and also better substitutes for time
30Ibid.,p.455,where Lee comments on Feige's regressions without dummy variables
in Table 3 on p.454.
31Frommuch experience, we are suspicious of this regression, which is for the
period 1934—64, excluding 1942—45. In such regressions, we have found that the results
are overly influenced by the difference between the period 1934—41 and 1946—64, i.e.,
the prewar and postwar periods. The difference between the averages for these periods
provides only one degree of freedom of the twenty-one or twenty-two that Lee has; yet
it may account for the bulk of his correlation and dominate the regression coefficients.
Before interpreting these results as he does, we would have to check the consistency
of behavior within the prewar and postwar periods separately with the difference be-
tween the averages for the two periods.
32Theconfusion is well illustrated by a possibly apocryphal story concerning an early
experience of Egon Pearson. On the basis of a statistical examination of the results of
two techniques, he is reported to have told some textile manufacturers for whom the
study was done that the difference between the two techniques was significant. One of
the manufacturers is said to have responded, "Young man, you tell us what the difference
is, and we will tell you if it is significant."Basis for Choice of Definition 183
deposits than are mutual savings bank deposits. He finds further in the
set of calculations yielding these results (a recalculation of Feige's re-
gressions without dummy variables) that demand deposits display nearly
as elastic a response to the yield on savings and loan shares as to their
own yield, and time deposits a much more elastic response than to their
own yield. Lee gets these results for data covering the deposits of all
holders of money. For such aggregates, the results are hard to accept.
Over half of demand deposits are held by business enterprises. These
hold next to no savings and loan shares or mutual savings bank deposits
but have held nonnegligible time deposits.
Lee also presents regressions using household data from the Survey
of Consumer Finances. For these, which presumably cover only house-
hold demand deposits, high cross-elasticities for demand deposits and
savings and loan shares are less implausible, and in fact Lee finds much
higher cross-elasticities than for the aggregate d,ata. But these regressions
also yield results that seem highly implausible, to put it mildly, on inter-
nal grounds. For example, according to the regressions, a one percent-
age point decline in the yield on demand deposits (i.e., a one percentage
point rise in service charges expressed as a ratio to deposits) will re-
duce the representative household's demand deposits by $660 and raise
its holdings of time and mutual savings bank deposits (treated, as one
variable) by $441 and of savings and loan shares by $510. That is,it
will raise the total of the two categories of nondemand deposits by 50
per cent more than it will reduce the holdings of demand deposits.
For time and mutual savings bank deposits there is no such contra-
diction. A one percentage point decline in their yield will, according to
Lee's regressions, reduce them by $588 and also reduce demand deposits
by $88 while raising savings and loan shares by $101. This may be a
plausible result.
But for savings and loan shares, the results are again clearly most
implausible. A one percentage point decline in their yield will, according
to Lee's regressions, reduce them by $262 but will raise demand deposits
by $227 and time and mutual savings bank deposits by $706 or the two
together by more than three and one-half times the reduction in savings
and loan shares.
There isclearly something fundamentally wrong with interpreting
these regressions as satisfactory demand functions. Yet they are the
only ones Lee presents that display high absolute cross-elasticities (—1.6184 Definition of Money
for demand deposits and —2.9 for time and mutual savings bank de-
posits with respect to the yield on savings and loan shares).
We conclude that Lee has grossly overstated the economic significance
of his calculations and the conflict between them and both Feige's and
our own findings.
In a later study, he has correlated per capita M1 and M2, in real
terms, with permanent per capita real income, various interest rate dif-
ferentials, and the lagged dependent variable. He uses annual data for
the United States for 195 1—65 and interprets the results as demand
equations.33 Lee concludes that "savings and loan shares are the closest
money substitutes among alternative types of assets."
This conclusion is not a valid inference from Lee's results because
they confound own-elasticity and cross-elasticity. Lee measures only the
response to the difference between the yield on the money total consid-
ered and the yield on the other assets, not the response to each yield
separately.
In an unpublished paper, Feige has recalculated Lee's regressions,
separating out the (negative) yield on demand deposits from the yields
on other assets. For two of Lee's regressions, which gave estimates of
—.63and —.66for the elasticity of the response of M1 to the difference
between the yield on M1 and on savings and loan shares, Feige estimates
an own-elasticity of demand for M1 with respect to the yield on demand
deposits of —.20(the same in both regressions) and a cross-elasticity
with respect to the yield on savings and loan shares of —.30and —.19
—hardly impressively high cross-elasticities. For all of the thirty-six
regressions Feige replicated, the own-yield absorbs most of the response
that is associated with the differentials used by Lee and that he errone-
ously attributed to cross-elasticities.34
"AlternativeInterest Rates and the Demand for Money: The Empirical Evidence,"
American Economic Review, Dec. 1967, Pp. 1168—1179. The interest rate differentials
he uses are between the yields on Mi or M2 and (a) on savings and loan shares, (b) on
four-to-six month commercial paper, (c) on twenty-year corporate bonds, (d) on com-
mon shares (dividend yield), and (e) for M1, on commercial bank time deposits.
34Sincethis was written, two comments on Lee's December 1967 American Economic
Review article and a reply by him have been published (Harvey Galper, "Alternative
Interest Rates and the Demand for Money: Comment," and Michael 3. Hamburger, the
identical title, American Economic Review, June 1969, pp. 401—412; Lee's reply is ibid.,
PP. 412—418). None of these items has any additional evidence on the relative merits
of M1 and M,, since all deal solely with regressions for M1. All are restricted to time
series data for 195 1—65. None acknowledges explicitly how slender a basis this is for
any far-reaching inferences—fifteen annual or sixty highly serially correlated quarterly
observations, submitted toliterally dozens of multiple regressions,of which only a
sample are reported (twenty-eight based on annual data, and twelve based on quarterlyBasis for Choice of Definition 185
5. In research on the demand for money, Karl Brunner and Allan H.
Meltzer experimented with two alternative definitions of money: the
narrow total of currency plus demand deposits, which they designate
M1, and the broader total we term money, which they designate M2.
They concluded, "Our results seem to suggest clearly that currency plus
demand deposits is the more appropriate definition. More inclusive defi-
nitions of money appear to mix the effects of general and relative changes
in interest rates and to obscure a part of the wealth-adjustment proc-
ess."We do not ourselves regard the evidence presented by Brunner
and Meltzer as giving anywhere nearly so clear a verdict.
Brunner and Meltzer describe four sets of comparisons between two
definitions of money.36 They assert that three sets of comparisons (1, 3,
and 4 of footnote 36) favor M1, in the sense of yielding smaller per-
centage errors of estimate for M1 than for M2, and that one set of com-
parisons (2 of footnote 36) favors M2.
For one set favoring each definition (1 and 2), the figures Brunner
and Meltzer cite clearly justify their assertions. However, the differences
in the set favoring M2 should receive much greater weight, since the
data), and with some reported regressions based on the fifteen annual observations con-
taining seven independent variables, leaving at best only seven degrees of freedom! To
add to the difficulty, the series have strong trends, so that the effective number of de-
grees of freedom is surely still smaller. Any conclusions based on such extensive manipu-
lation of so slender a body of data must be regarded as exceedingly tentative hypotheses
until tested with independent evidence. Yet the several authors show no recognition that
this is the case. Galper mainly simply repeats Lee's earlier calculations but with quarterly
data. His main contribution is the construction of a quarterly series of advertised in-
terest rates on savings and loan shares by interpolation of semiannual data. Given the
strong trends in the data, it is not surprising that the quarterly data give about the same
results as the annual data. Hamburger separates own-elasticity from cross-elasticity and
finds that this reduces appreciably the calculated elasticity attributed to savings and
loan shares. He also introduces a variety of different interest rates and concludes that
there is a wide variety of different assets that are equally good substitutes for M1. Lee
disputes Hamburger's results largely on statistical grounds, but, as in the difference be-
tween him and Feige, his reported regressions differ less from Hamburger's numerically
than do the words he uses to describe them. In the nineteen multiple regressions of
annual and quarterly data that he reports, the highest estimated cross-elasticity with
respect to the rate on savings and loan shares is —.48—andthis in a regression that
combines own- and cross-elasticity. The highest separate cross-elasticity is —.33.Yet he
describes these resultsas substantiating "the substitution hypothesis of Gurley and
Shaw ...indicatingthat the nonbank intermediary liabilities are close substitutes for
money" (p. 417)!
35 Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, "Predicting Velocity: Implications for Theory
and Policy," Journal of Finance, May 1963, p. 350.
36 (1) Between equations K3 and K4, fitted alternatively, using (the narrow defi-
nition) and M2 (our definition); (2) between equation F2, in which M2 is used, and
equation F3, in which Mi is used; (3) between equations WI, W2, W3, and W4, in
which Mi and M2 are used alternatively; and (4) between equation WF2, in which M2
is used, and equation WF3, in which Mi is used.186 Definition of Money
equations in that set give decidedly lower percentage errors than the
equations in the other and hence provide more information. For one set
(3), Brunner and Meltzer do not give figures on percentage errors for
both definitions, so we cannot judge their assertion. For one set which
they regard as favoring M1 (4), their assertion is not justified by the
data they present.37
We conclude that the evidence is by no means "clear," though if we
accept as correct their interpretation of the set (3) that we cannot judge
independently, it weights the scales somewhat in favor of M1.
6. On the basis of a comparison of growth rates of money, defined
narrowly and also as we do, and of the turning points of business cycles
since June 1914, the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank has concluded
that the relationship is somewhat more reliable for the narrow definition.
The rate of change of time deposits did not fall before the business
cycle peaks of 1920, 1923, 1937, 1953, and 1957, nor rise before
business cycle troughs in 1921, 1924, 1933, and 1949. According to
the St. Louis study, the reason that rates of change in money broadly
defined lead turns in business, by much the same time spans as do the
rates of change in money narrowly defined, is that movements of the
broader definition are dominate4 by movements of the narrow defini-
tion. "Adding time deposits to money does not appear to fashion a
variable which is more closely related to business cycle peaks and
troughs but simply creates the possibility of obscuring the relationship
between monetary action and economic activity. In view of the rapid
growth of time deposits relative to demand deposits, the relationship
between changes in the growth rate of money plus time deposits and
cyclical turning points may be less in the future than in the past." 38
7.In a paper dealing mostly with other issues, David Laidler inci-
dentally compared the stability of demand functions for both total I
and total II, using U.S. data for 1920—60. He concluded that "the
37'Theygive two measures of predictive performance for the whole thirty-nine-year
period covered (1910—40 and 1951—58): mean absolute percentage error, and root mean
square absolute per cent error. They also give the first measure for four subperiods. For
the period as a whole, the mean absolute errors are 4.6 per cent for equation WF2 and
4.2 per cent for equation WF3: the root mean square errors are 4.4 per cent and 5.0
per cent. Thus the two measures differ in direction. Moreover, equation WF2 has the
smaller mean error for two of the four subperiods; equation WF3 for the other two.
This appears to be rather a standoff and does not seem to us to justify the authors'
assertion that "a comparison of WF2 shows that... demandfunctions for money de-.
fined as are subject to smaller errors of prediction than those in which money is
defined as M2" (ibid., p. 339).
38"MoneySupply and Time Deposits, 1914—1964," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review, Sept. 1964, p. 8.Basis for Choice of Definition 187
stability of the demand function for money is improved by including
time deposits in the definition of money."
8. In a recent study William Gibson, using U.S. data, 1947—66,
computed thirty-two pairs of comparable equations expressing interest
rates (or first differences of interest rates) as a function of current and
prior monetary magnitudes (levels,first, or second differences), the
two equations in a pair differing only in that one used M1 as the mone-
tary total, the other M2. Of the thirty-two pairs, the correlation co-
efficient was higher for M1 in ten, for M2 in twenty-one, and the same
for M1 and M2 in one.4°
9. George Kaufman has extended the Friedman-Meiselman correla-
tions described in section 3 above.4' He correlated quarter-to-quarter
firstdifferences of gross national product and alternative monetary
totals for 1953—66 and two subperiods. This interval covers eight years
subsequent to those covered in the Friedman-Meiselman correlations,
though it drops some of the earlier years. In his computations for leads
—ranging from money leading by four quarters to money lagging by
two quarters—as well as in his synchronous observations, Kaufman
covered a wider variety of monetary totals than Friedman-Meiselman.
By the criterion described in footnote 21 above, Kaufman's correla-
tions show M2 to be preferable to M, when the monetary observation
leads the GNP observation by either two or three quarters, for both
1953—66 as a whole and for each of the subperiods 1953—59 and
1960—66. They show M, to be preferable for synchronous observations
for the period as a whole but only the first of the subperiods. For
leads of two and three quarters for the period as a whole and for the
first subperiod, and for leads of one and three quarters for the second
subperiod, totals broader than M2 are preferable to M2, though by
very narrow margins.42 Kaufman himself concludes:
39 David Laidler, "Some Evidence on the Demand for Money," Journalof Political
Economy,Feb. 1966, pp. 55—68;quotationfrom p. 55.
40 "The Effects of Money on Interest Rates," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Chicago, 1967.
41 "More on an Empirical Definition of Money," American Economic Review, Mar.
1969, pp. 78—87.
42 For the period as a whole, the broader totals that are preferable are our totals III
and IV, and his M4 equal to our IV plus U.S. government savings bonds (Kaufman
excludes postal savings deposits for his counterpart to our totals III and IV, including
them in his M4; we have neglected this minor difference between his definitions and
ours). For a lead of three quarters, the correlation for our total II (M2)is.36, for M4,
.40; for a lead of two quarters, the corresponding correlations are .44 and .46. Kaufman
also computes a still broader total, equal to his M4 plus U.S. government marketable
securities maturing within one year. Generally this is decidedly inferior to the other
totals except for leads of one and two quarters for the second subperiod.188 Definition of Money
defining money according to the dual criteria established by F[ried-
man]-M[eiselman] involves not only tests of alternative groupings of financial
assets but also tests of alternative definitions over a number of lead-lag re-
lationships with respect to income. Different components show different
correlations as they are associated with income in preceding, concurrent, and
later periods. A definition that includes demand and time deposits at com-
mercial banks [our II =M2]appears best at explaining income two or more
quarters later. Demand deposits and currency are best at explaining income
observed concurrently and one quarter later. Currency alone is the money
supply concept most highly correlated with income in earlier periods.
[I]nclusion of savings-type deposits beyond time deposits at commercial
banks...addsrelativelylittle explanatory power to the definition of
money....[T}beevidence is generally consistent with the conclusions of
F-M that an important and relatively stable relationship exists between
money and income in succeeding periods, although the precise character-
istic of the relationship varies with the definition of money. Only when
money is defined to include currency alone is support provided for a theory
relating money to earlier observations of income.45
10. V. Karuppan Chetty (see footnote 5 above) has estimated from
postwar data the weights that should be assigned to commercial bank
time deposits, mutual savings deposits, and savings and loan shares in
constructing a monetary aggregate as a weighted sum of components
(see footnote 5 above for a brief description of his procedure). He
arbitrarily assigned a weight of unity to currency plus adjusted demand
deposits and estimated the weights for the other components as unity for
commercial bank time deposits, 0.88 for mutual savings deposits, and
0.615 for savings and loan shares.
These results confirm our own, both in indicating that total commer-
cial bank deposits should be included in the monetary aggregate rather
than only demand deposits and that, for the postwar period, a still
broader aggregate may be better yet.
However, while we believe that this approach is extremely promising,
we have serious reservations about how much confidence can be placed
in Chetty's specffic results for two reasons. First, they are derived en-
tirely from post-World War II data which are dominated by trends.
Second, on a purely theoretical level, we believe his formulation has the
defect that it makes the results depend on a strictly arbitrary choice of
the time unit used in stating interest rates (see footnote 2 of Chetty's
article).
48Ibid.,pp.86—87.Evidence on Alternative Definitions 189
Appendix to Chapter 4
EVIDENCE ON ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF MONEY
This appendix presents the evidence summarized in section 3.
1. Comparison of States with and without Savings Banks
Mutual savings banks are in existence in only a minority of the states.
A comparison of states with and without mutual savings banks should
shed some light on the treatment of deposits in such banks. If these
deposits are regarded by their holders as essentially equivalent to—
that is, as nearly perfect substitutes for—commercial bank time deposits,
the total of the two in states with mutual savings banks should be com-
parable with commercial bank time deposits alone in other states. On
the other hand, if they are regarded as very different from commercial
bank time deposits and as substitutes rather for other assets such as
government bonds, then commercial bank time deposits alone should
be comparable for states with and without mutual savings banks. Given
the differences among states in population, per capita income, and
economic structure, however, the absolute amount of deposits in differ-
ent states can hardly be meaningfully compared; some scale adjustment
is needed. For our scale adjustment we expressed the various types of
time deposits as a ratio to demand deposits; it would be preferable to
use currency plus demand deposits, but, unfortunately, no data are
available on the distribution of currency among the states.
These ratios are given in Table 10 for 1915, 1929, and 1950. The
results were surprising to us. We had expected that the ratio of com-
mercial bank time deposits alone to demand deposits (call this T) in
states without mutual savings banks would be between the corresponding
ratio for states with mutual savings banks and the ratio of commercial
bank plus mutual savings deposits to demand deposits (call this M +
T) in such states. What we had hoped for from the numerical evidence
was an indication of whether T for states without mutual savings banks
was closer to the one extreme or the other. In fact, in each of the three
years for which the ratios were computed, the value of T alone in states
with mutual savings banks tends to be higher than the value of T in
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bank time deposits to demand deposits in the states with mutual savings
banks is .82, 1.29, and .62 for 1915, 1929, and 1950, respectively,
and only .62, .88, and .36 in the other states. A glance at the figures
in Table 10 shows that this is not an accident produced by one or two
extreme values. Apparently there is some relationship between the pres-
ence of mutual savings banks and a high preference for time deposits
whether in such banks or in others. As we suggest in the text, the fact
that mutual savings banks are mostly in older and more highly de-
veloped areas may produce such a relationship.
Examination of the ratios for neighboring reasonably similar
states does not resolve the difficulty or give any clear indication of the
status of mutual savings deposits. The ratios are closer together for
New York and New Jersey, and for New Hampshire and Vermont,
when mutual savings deposits are included than when they are excluded;
on the other hand, they are closer together for Ohio and Indiana, Mary-
land and Virginia, when mutual savings deposits are excluded.
It is hai4 to know how to interpret these data. They clearly raise
more questions than they answer. For our purpose, it seems perhaps
more reasonable to regard the data as an argument for excluding mutual
savings bank deposits than for including them. In either treatment, states
with mutual savings banks make a heavier contribution to time than to
demand deposits. The inclusion of mutual savings deposits makes this
difference greater than their exclusion.
2. Cross-Section Correlations of Deposits and Personal Income
We can use the state-by-state data in still another way by correlating
various deposit items and totals with personal income, all the variables
being expressed per capita to eliminate the effect of population differ-
ences. Table 11 shows, for six selected years (1929, 1935, 1940, 1950,
1955, and 1960), correlation coefficients between personal income and
demand deposits, commercial bank time deposits, mutual savings de-
posits, and two subtotals: (1) demand deposit plus commercial bank
time deposits and (2) total 1 plus mutual savings deposits. In addition,
for 1950, 1955, and 1960, Table 11 gives correlation coefficients be-
tween personal income and savings and loan shares and (3), total 2
plus savings and loan shares.
One striking uniformity is that the correlations with individual de-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.196 Definition of Money
the correlations with totals of the components. So far as this goes, it
suggests that the components are in some measure substitutes and that
one of the broader totals is preferable as a concept of money to de-
mand deposits alone. As among the totals for 1929, 1935, and 1940
the correlations are highest for the sum of demand deposits and com-
mercial bank time deposits. For 1950, 1955, and 1960, the correlations
are highest for the total that also includes mutual savings bank deposits
and savings and loan shares. This supports for the pre-Worid War II
period the total we have used, but a broader total for the
War II period.
The correlations for the components are roughly the same for the first
three years in the table but appreciably lower for 1950, 1955, and 1960
than for the earlier years. There is a similar difference for total1,
commercial bank deposits. For total 2, which adds mutual savings de-
posits, only the correlation for 1960 is appreciably lower than the others.
One possible explanation for these differences isthe lower relative
variability of personal income among states in the final three years than
in the earlier three years (Table 12). The logarithmic standard devia-
tions of personal income, in natural logarithms (these can be regarded
as estimates of the coefficients of variation of the original observations),
are .38, .37, .37, .25, .22, and .22 in the six years. Such a decline means
that there is less of a systematic difference in personal income among
states to pro4uce systematic differences in deposits; hence the variation
in deposit holdings attributable to income differences will tend to be
smaller. Unless the other variables affecting deposit holding have also
become more uniform among states, the effect is to reduce the fraction
of the variation accounted for by income, and hence the correlation co-
efficient. For total 2, this effect appears to have been overcome, at least
to some extent, by the emergence of a closer connection between that
deposit total and personal income.